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Religious Exemptions and the Limited Relevance of Corporate Identity
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle1

Abstract
Corporate religious liberty appears to be on the rise. The Supreme Court’s unanimous
decision in Hosanna Tabor v. EEOC (2012) energized sweeping theories about “freedom of the
church.” The Court’s more controversial decision in Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014)
determined that for-profit entities may be legally entitled to claim a corporate religious
character. Speaking in the language of rights, commentators have vigorously debated the
foundations and meaning of these decisions.
This chapter argues that these debates are misdirected. The special treatment of religion
in American constitutional law does not properly rest on any theory that religious entities enjoy
a distinctive set of rights. Instead, the relevant limitation on government arises from the
Constitution’s Establishment Clause. The governing principle, deeply grounded in history, can
best be understood as a prohibition on government involvement – through regulation or
financial support – in “purely and strictly ecclesiastical matters.” That principle (developed at
greater length in our book, Secular Government, Religious People) explains why the government
may not decide, for example, who is fit for ministry or which faction within a church is acting in
fidelity to its original teachings. The principle applies with equal force to the state’s relationship
with houses of worship, religious non-profit institutions such as schools or charities, and forprofit businesses whose owners assert a corporate religious character. The only legally relevant
differences among these types of organizations should be derived from the likelihood that the
principle will be implicated in any particular case.
After reviewing the 19th century underpinnings of this singular approach, and offering
pertinent reminders of limits on state financial support for religious teaching, the chapter
focuses primarily on the context of employment regulation. Along the way, the chapter
addresses concrete questions, such as whether a for-profit business can ever successfully assert
a ministerial exception with respect to any of its employees. The answer may surprise you.
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In 21st century America, religion tends to be understood in individualistic terms.
Believers typically articulate their faith in terms of a personal relationship with God. Most
religious people, however, live out their faith in the company of others. Quite frequently, these
associations are organized as corporations – entities in which the body as a whole possesses
unified legal personhood. In this chapter, we explore the implications of that legal personhood
for the exercise of religion, and more particularly for the question of religious exemptions from
general laws.

This exploration occurs against the backdrop of the prominent and recent focus on “the
freedom of the church,” advocated by a number of scholars in this field.2 Although proponents
of that concept differ in various ways, they share a commitment to the idea that religious
institutions are constitutionally entitled to a zone of freedom in which to govern themselves.
Beyond that abstract proposition, however, these proponents tend to ignore crucial questions
about the meaning and scope of “the freedom of the church.”

First, many offer no guidance for determining which institutions, apart from houses of
worship, constitute “the church.”3 Is a large state-funded non-profit, such as a hospital or social
welfare agency, “the church” simply because it has a religious name and origin? Can for-profit
entities ever come within the boundaries of “the church”? Who counts as the church when rival
factions claim authority? Second, the proponents fail to specify the scope of “internal
governance,” a category within which proponents claim churches to be autonomous. Are all
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See chapters XX-XX in this book.
Zoe Robinson offers guidance in What is a “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 181
(2014), but for reasons developed below, we think her approach is deeply flawed.
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matters involving corporate structure, employment relations, or uses of church property offlimits to the state?

Moreover, to the extent that “internal governance” conflicts with government regulation,
proponents fail to specify how such conflicts should be resolved.4 Some who argue for church
autonomy emphasize the method of interest balancing, in which the liberty claims of the church
are set off against the state’s interest in enforcing its laws.5 This interest balancing has been
formalized in statutes like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

We think this emphasis on the “freedom of the church” and the accompanying method of
interest balancing are profoundly misguided. As we have explored at length elsewhere,6 the
story of religious liberty in America is not one of mandatory religion-specific accommodations,
or an autonomous domain for “the church.” Instead, the roots of religious liberty can be traced
to limits on the state’s character. A secular government is barred, by its basic identity as
expressed in the Establishment Clause, from proclaiming religious truth or adjudicating religious
questions. This prohibition certainly creates a zone of non-interference, but the justification for
that limit does not arise from the liberty of religious institutions.7

See Richard Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: (Towards) an Exposition, Translation, and
Defense, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 33 (2013) (dismissing concern about line-drawing
as common to all legal doctrines). This is not an adequate response, because one only knows the
meaning of a legal norm by understanding how it applies in the context of other norms.
5
Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, 7 Geo. J.L. & Pub Pol’y 253 (2009).
6
Ira C, Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Secular Government, Religious People (Wm. B. Eerdmans
Co., 2014)
7
Religious institutions do enjoy robust rights of association and expression, but only to the
extent enjoyed by analogous non-religious institutions. Secular Government, Religious People,
chapter 5.
4
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The misplaced emphasis on the liberty of religious institutions becomes even more
problematic when coupled with the use of interest balancing to reconcile the claims of liberty
with the concerns of the state. In addition to the notorious indeterminacy of interest balancing as
a method, the context of religious rights raises particular problems for that method. Those
problems relate directly to the core issues of the state’s limited competence. In applying RFRA
and its legal analogues, a court often must first decide whether a plaintiff’s religious exercise has
been “substantially burdened” by government action. That inquiry, if rigorously pursued, would
require the court to assess the religious significance of the practice at issue. But such religious
determinations are outside the state’s competence.8

Our approach avoids the problems that arise from using “the freedom of the church” as
the driving norm, as well as interest balancing as the method for addressing problems. Our
general thesis in this chapter is that corporate entities with asserted religious identities deserve
exceptional treatment only with respect to their distinctively religious activities. The state may
not participate in or, other than prevention of force or fraud, regulate the distinctive aspects of
religious experience: gathering for worship, religious instruction, and spiritual or sacramental
celebration of life’s major events.

As we explain, religious exercise may take corporate form for a wide spectrum of actions
and purposes. At one end of the spectrum sit houses of worship, the paradigmatic form of
religious corporation. Such entities tend to be heavily engaged in performance of distinctively
religiously activities. No one questions the religious identity of such institutions, although

8

Id. at chapter 6.
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questions remain about the implications that follow from such recognition. Even houses of
worship act in ways that are not religiously distinctive at all. Like many secular entities, houses
of worship (for example) build and use parking facilities for their members and guests, and they
prepare and serve food at large gatherings they host. These kinds of activities are subject to
regulation in the public interest.

In the broad middle of the spectrum are found many organizations that assert religious
identities but act in ways considerably removed from the typical functions of houses of worship.
These organizations cover an immense range. They include social welfare organizations, such as
shelters for the homeless or victims of domestic violence; educational institutions, ranging from
pre-schools to research universities; hospitals and assisted living facilities; and many others.
Because this middle category includes such a wide variety of activities and purposes, and covers
a range in size that runs from tiny neighborhood organizations to multi-billion dollar hospital
chains, the category presents an endless variety of questions about how the corporations’
religious identity should affect their legal rights and obligations.

The distinctive religious character of these organizations is frequently quite thin. For
example, religiously affiliated hospitals are far more like secular private hospitals, or even
publicly controlled hospitals, than they are like churches, mosques, or synagogues. Granted,
religiously affiliated hospitals may refrain for religious reasons from offering certain services,
but in what they do offer, their resemblance to all other hospitals is striking. Religious
exemptions for non-profit organizations in this broad mid-range should be directly linked to the
religiously distinctive activities they undertake.

5

At the other end of the spectrum, highlighted by the decision in Hobby Lobby, are forprofit entities that claim a religious identity, despite their full involvement in the economic
marketplace. For-profit entities are strikingly similar to one another in the profit-making motives
that animate them, and in the goods and services in which they traffic. Yet even for-profit firms
may act in religiously distinctive ways, disconnected from profit motives, such as recognizing a
Sabbath or other religious holidays. Although the Administration argued in Hobby Lobby that
for-profit corporations are incapable of engaging in the “exercise of religion,” the Supreme Court
ruled otherwise.9 Despite this recognition, the Supreme Court’s decision leaves open significant
questions about the legal consequences that should flow from the successful assertion of
religious identity by a commercial entity. Going forward, the questions after Hobby Lobby will
be far less about which entities have rights of religious exercise, and far more about precisely
what rights of religious exercise corporate identities may legitimately assert.

In what follows, we analyze questions of corporate identity and religious exemptions
along the lines we have suggested in these introductory paragraphs. The extent to which an
organization and its activities are distinctively religious will go a long way in explaining when
religious exemptions are appropriate. Across the board, such exemptions should be directly
related to the religiously distinctive qualities the exemptions are designed to recognize and
protect. Religion-specific exemptions that are unrelated to those qualities are rarely more than
unjustifiable special privileges for religious entities over their secular counterparts.

9

The Hobby Lobby majority rejected that argument, and only Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor
agreed with it. Justices Breyer and Kagan abstained from decision on the question.
6

Houses of Worship

For many traditions, the most significant religious experiences are corporate. The
community of faith gathers for prayer, liturgy, and instruction. Individuals may practice aspects
of the faith in isolation, but that practice is subordinate to communal experience. Characterizing
that religious experience as nothing more than the associational sum of participating individuals’
religious experiences misses a crucial element of corporate religious experience. In much of the
Christian tradition, for example, the church itself is indispensible for salvation. It is the “Body of
Christ,” in which members are united with the savior and all other believers, living and dead.
From this theological perspective, the believer’s union with the sacred community is prior to and
distinct from his or her individuated life in the world. Most fundamentally, the church gives life
to the believer, not vice versa (as a traditional theory of associations would hold). Because of
this theological priority for so many believers, any adequate account of religious freedom should
acknowledge the concern about the integrity of religious community.

This theological understanding of religious entities underlies the legal assertion of
“church autonomy,” an institutional parallel to the idea of personal autonomy, which marks off a
zone of freedom from state control. Advocates of this idea seem to believe that the only way the
government can show concern for the integrity of the church is to adopt a stance of broad
deference. Within the boundaries of “church,” authority belongs to those assigned it by religious
doctrine. The state shows its respect for the “freedom of the church” by denying that the state
has jurisdiction, except in rare instances, over matters that the church deems “internal” to its faith
and practice.

7

The idea of church autonomy certainly has a long historical pedigree, reaching back to
the Gregorian reforms of the middle ages. But broad notions of church autonomy cannot be
reconciled with the history and current jurisprudence of “church and state” – the legal
relationship between civil authority and houses of worship. From the early years of the republic,
the law has treated houses of worship much the same as other legal entities. Although Virginia
barred religious congregations from incorporating, other states did not follow suit, and regularly
granted corporate charters to houses of worship.

As Professor Gordon’s recent work demonstrates, these religious corporations were
bound by the same web of state law on matters of tort, property, contract and corporate status as
other entities.10 For example, general laws of incorporation that arose in the early 19th century in
America frequently included a requirement that churches create boards of trustees controlled by
lay members of a congregation rather than its clergy. States imposed this condition as a way to
limit ecclesiastical power.11 Thus, as an historical matter, a general doctrine of “church
autonomy” for churches held in corporate form is a complete fiction. Nothing in American state
or federal law supports the idea that houses of worship enjoy a presumptive, general immunity
from the government’s jurisdiction.

The only exceptions to this principle of non-distinctiveness can be found in the contexts
of factional disputes within congregations or conflicts about ministerial employment. These

10

Sarah Barringer Gordon, The First Disestablishment: Limits on Church Power and Property
Before the Civil War, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 307 (2014).
11
States also included limits on the total value of property held by a single religious entity. Id.
8

exceptions are best understood as reflections of the state’s limited competence in matters of
religious doctrine.12 During the first half of the 19th century, state courts wrestled with a wide
variety of intra-congregational or intra-denominational disputes, in which two or more factions
vied for control of a religious body. Although some courts were willing to hear lawsuits that
turned on quintessentially theological issues, such as the orthodoxy of certain beliefs about
human sinfulness, a significant number of courts expressed uneasiness about such inquiries.

A pair of US Supreme Court cases, decided in 1871 and 1872, vividly illustrates the
emerging idea of how the exercise of the state’s power to adjudicate should interact with houses
of worship. In Watson v. Jones,13 the Court considered a dispute that had arisen out of the
response of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (“PCUSA”) to the Civil
War. A congregation in Louisville, Kentucky had divided over the issues of slavery and
secession. The national denomination ruled that the pro-slavery faction had departed from the
doctrine of the PCUSA, and accordingly, that the anti-slavery faction was entitled to control the
congregation and its property. The matter ultimately reached the Supreme Court. Applying a
version of federal common law, rather than constitutional principles, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that courts were barred from deciding “strictly and purely ecclesiastical questions.”
Instead, the dispute must be resolved by deference to the body within the church that has
decision-making power over such questions – in this case, that body was the PCUSA.

That Watson v. Jones was about questions that are off limits to the state rather than
church autonomy was vividly demonstrated just one year later, in the Court’s decision in Bouldin
12
13

For elaboration see Secular Government, Religious People, chapter 2.
80 U.S. 679 (1871).
9

v. Alexander.14 A dispute had arisen within a Baptist congregation in the District of Columbia.
The founding minister, Rev. Albert Bouldin, had lost the support of a majority of the
congregation as well as all four of the congregation’s trustees. Bouldin selected a new set of
trustees from among his followers and together they proceeded to change the locks on the church
and bar the rest of the congregation from entering.

The four originally elected trustees sued to regain the use of the property and to have
Bouldin’s acts declared unlawful. Bouldin argued that the Supreme Court had no authority over
this internal religious dispute. The Court disagreed. Although the Court reaffirmed the previous
year’s ruling in Watson that the state may not answer certain ecclesiastical questions, the state
may nevertheless use ordinary principles of corporate law to determine who has authority to
resolve those questions for the church. In Bouldin’s case, the Court held that the minister lacked
the authority to unilaterally replace the trustees elected by the congregation. Under the
congregation’s governing documents, the authority to appoint trustees was held by the
congregation acting through majority vote.

Thus, by 1872, federal common law recognized no theory of church autonomy. Rather,
the law treated houses of worship precisely as it treated other entities, except when courts were
asked to resolve “strictly and purely ecclesiastical questions.”

In the second half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court reinforced and provided
constitutional grounding to the principles reflected in Watson and Bouldin. In a series of

14

82 U.S. 131 (1872).
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decisions in the 1950s and 1960s about property disputes, the Court limited the authority of
courts and legislatures to intervene in the resolution of controversies over ecclesiastical
questions. The Court repeatedly ruled that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
mandated the application of what was a common law principle in Watson v. Jones.15

Presbyterian Church in the United States vs. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church16 provides the starkest example of this constitutional understanding. In the
mid-1960’s, a number of Presbyterian congregations disagreed with their denomination’s
position on several theological and social issues, including the ordination of women, support for
the civil rights movement, and opposition to the Vietnam War. When the congregations
attempted to exit the denomination and retain ownership of the local church property, litigation
ensued. The Georgia courts resolved those disputes by invoking a principle of implied trust,
under which title to the property depended on which faction was acting in fidelity to the true
doctrine of the church. Applying that principle, the jury found in favor of the local congregation.
Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the First
Amendment bars civil courts from deciding the kind of question the jury in Georgia had been
charged with answering. Instead, the Court ruled, the Georgia courts must find ways to resolve
this dispute without considering such ecclesiastical questions.

In the aftermath of Blue Hull, the Court made a series of decisions reaffirming, in
constitutional terms, the companion principle from Bouldin v. Alexander. The series culminated
15

Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S.
94 (1952); Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); Presbyterian Church v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
16
393 U.S. 440 (1969).
11

a decade after Blue Hull in Jones v. Wolf,17 which again involved disputes within Presbyterian
congregations in Georgia. In an opinion by Justice Blackmun for a five Justice majority, the
Court decided that state courts have a choice when presented with disputes over control of
church property. These disputes can be resolved either by deferring to the body within the faith
community that has authority over the relevant ecclesiastical questions, or by using “neutral
principles of law” to examine the legal documents that identify ownership of the disputed
property. By invoking the concept of “neutral principles,” the Court reaffirmed and gave
constitutional warrant to the common law approach of Bouldin – churches are subject to the
same norms of contract, property, and trust law as other entities. What remains out of bounds
after Jones v. Wolf is what has always been out of bounds – the judicial resolution of “strictly
and purely ecclesiastical questions.”

In a pair of cases addressing disputes over ecclesiastical personnel, the Court has applied
an identical set of principles about the scope and limits of judicial power. The first of these,
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese of America v. Milivojevich (1976),18 involved a bishop’s
challenge to his removal. After the Illinois courts ordered the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church
to reinstate Milivojevich, the Supreme Court reversed. Echoing the themes from its decision in
Blue Hull, the Court held that decisions over who is fit to hold ecclesiastical office belong solely
to church authorities. Civil courts are constitutionally incompetent to decide who belongs in
such a role.

17
18

443 U.S. 595 (1979).
426 U.S. 696 (1976).
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The Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor19 is a direct outgrowth of this line of decisions.
Hosanna-Tabor does not stand for any sweeping “freedom of the church.” The decision would
never have garnered the votes of all nine Justices if its foundation were so broad, vague in
contour, and inconsistent with the past several hundred years of American law. Instead, the
“ministerial exception” embraced in Hosanna-Tabor reflects precisely the constitutionally
mandated allocation of competence over the question of who is fit for the role of clergy or
teacher of the faith. The exception’s contours respond directly to the need of religious
communities to have full control over who transmits their defining message.

That said, whether a particular position falls within the ministerial exception is a question
that civil courts are necessarily qualified to answer. If they were not, the ministerial exception
would effectively immunize religious entities from ordinary employment law norms. Churches
would always be able to assert that any of their employees function as ministers, and courts
would be bound to accept that determination. Instead, the ruling in Hosanna Tabor reserves to
courts the authority to decide, in light of the exception’s underlying justification, which positions
the exception covers. 20 In this respect, courts’ competence to decide which positions are
covered is analogous to courts’ role in determining which private activities government is
forbidden, under the Establishment Clause, to directly fund. In making these judgments, like all
others under the Establishment Clause, courts are called upon to draw lines about the limits of
the state’s power.

19

132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
For a nice example of a close case and the court’s proper handling of it, see Archdiocese of
Washington v. Moerson, 399 Md. 637; 925 A.2d 659 (2007).
20
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Thus, Hosanna-Tabor does not recognize any general “freedom of the church.” The
unanimous opinion in Hosanna-Tabor explicitly left open questions that might arise between a
clergy member and her employer under the law of contract and tort. For example, if a rabbi has
served a congregation for the past month under an employment contract, and the congregation
refuses to pay his salary at the end of the month, the rabbi may sue and recover his unpaid
wages. Under general principles of law, the employer-congregation may not assert his unfitness
or inadequacy in the role as a defense to his claim, though the employer may discharge him and
avoid future wage claims.21

Similarly, if the assistant pastor of a congregation alleges that she was sexually assaulted
by the congregation’s senior pastor, she would certainly have tort claims against the senior
pastor, and perhaps also against the congregation for negligent hiring or supervision of the senior
pastor.22 Like the rabbi’s claim for back wages, the assistant pastor’s claim of sexual assault
would require no inquiry into ecclesiastical questions, and therefore does not implicate the
constitutional concerns that justify the ministerial exception.

Another striking example of a religious exemption that cannot be traced to any distinctive
limits on the state’s authority in religious matters is the “parsonage exemption” from federal
income tax.23 This provision of the Internal Revenue Code exempts from the income of
members of the clergy the value of housing provided by the house of worship that employs them,
21

We explore additional examples of such disputes in Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, Courts,
Clergy and Congregations: Disputes Between Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 Geo.
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 119 (2009).
22
Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1789.
23
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 107.
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as well as any housing allowance similarly provided. This treatment of housing and housing
allowances deviates sharply from the tax treatment afforded similar benefits provided by
employers to other kinds of employees; in all non-clergy cases, such provisions are taxable
unless the particular housing provided is for the employer’s convenience, such as a university
president’s residence on campus. Although the parsonage exemption was perhaps once justified
by the practice of congregations providing housing attached to the house of worship, thus
allowing the minister to be readily reached by parishioners in need, the current scope of the
“parsonage exemption” bears little relation to that original situation. Now, clergy may use the
parsonage exemption to exclude from income tax a housing allowance that subsidizes a
mortgage for a home distant from the place of worship, and quite a bit more valuable than the
use of a unit attached to the church. It is no wonder that the exemption has been the subject of
recent attack under the Establishment Clause.24

Even though the ministerial exception applies to a relatively narrow set of employees,
houses of worship have an additional exemption that applies to all employees. Under Section
702, religious institutions are exempt from Title VII’s ban on employment discrimination “with
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion….” In other words, religious
institutions, unlike other employers, are free to hire employees who share the institution’s faith
commitments.25

24

Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Lew, __ F.Supp.3d ___ (W.D. Wisc. 2013), vacated on
standing grounds, __ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. 2014).
25
In contrast to the ministerial exception, Section 702 does not exempt religious institutions
from Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin. See
Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, U.S. Assistant Attorney General (Oct. 12, 2000), at 30–
32 and cases cited therein, archived at http://perma.cc/PAL9-3NE4.
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Thus far, in our discussion of the state’s distinctive treatment of churches, we have
focused on the exemption of religious organizations from legal norms that apply to analogous
non-religious entities. Any comprehensive consideration of the distinctive role of houses of
worship in the constitutional order, however, must also come to grips with deeply rooted
constitutional norms concerning government’s financial support for the activities of such
organizations. Indeed, in all the talk in this volume about the distinctive rights of autonomous
religious institutions, there is precious little attention to this component of the church-state
relationship.

We cannot in this space survey all developments in this part of the subject. But we must
note both the historical and contemporary concerns about direct government support for houses
of worship and those who lead them. Jefferson’s Bill for Religious Liberty in Virginia, one of
the earliest and most important moves in this direction, explicitly forbade any state support for
“any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever.”26 The U.S. Supreme Court has developed
a complex body of law about government aid to religious organizations that provide various
social services with secular value, such as education or health care. But the Court has
consistently affirmed that the government may not fund the core religious activities of worship,
proselytizing, or religious instruction.27

26

Va. Const. Art. 1, § 16.
For analysis of a difficult context in which to apply this principle, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert
W. Tuttle, Historic Preservation Grants to Houses of Worship: A Case Study in the Survival of
Separationism, 43 B. C. L. Rev. 1139 (2002). See also Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004)
(government had discretion to exclude study of ministry from voucher-type state support).
27
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The constitutional status of houses of worship thus reveals a distinctive limitation on state
power. The state has no legitimate interest in matters that are “strictly and purely ecclesiastical.”
Thus, government may not decide questions of that character, including who is fit to lead a
congregation. In a precisely complementary norm, the government may not subsidize
institutions or positions devoted primarily to such matters. Recognizing the reach and limit of
these principles will take us a very long way in assessing the constitutional status of other
organizations that hold themselves out as religious.

Religious Non-profit Organizations

The category of religious non-profits encompasses a broad variety of organizations.
These entities include institutions engaged in education at all levels, healthcare, social welfare
services such as adoption and foster care, and faith-based political advocacy. They relate to
houses of worship or religious denominations in a variety of ways, including complete control of
the non-profit by a single congregation, affiliation with a denomination, sponsorship by an interfaith coalition, or complete independence from any religious body.

To what extent should the religious identity of these non-profits affect their legal rights or
duties? As in the case of houses of worship, the distinctive identity of religious non-profits can
have implications for both government regulation and government financial support. The
concern for government involvement in the formation of religious character and the proclamation
of religious ideas leads to heightened sensitivity, but not to categorical immunity from regulation
or exclusion from support.

17

Our approach differs markedly from that of scholars who ask whether or not particular
institutions have a set of designated characteristics that mark them as religious.28 Under such an
approach, if the entity satisfies that test, then it enjoys the same broad freedom from regulation as
houses of worship; those who fail the test are treated identically with secular non-profits.

We think such a binary approach is unhelpful or worse. Most importantly, this approach
suffers from all of the defects of the justifiably discredited concept of “pervasively sectarian”
institutions. Under the law as it stood from the early 1970’s through at least the late 1990’s,
pervasively sectarian entities – typically, religious elementary and secondary schools -- were
disqualified from receiving direct public support. Such disqualification created a strong
incentive for institutions to change or dilute their religious character in order to make themselves
eligible for government support. A binary measure for immunity from regulation would likewise
create incentives to alter or strengthen religious character as a way to obtain that benefit.
Whether the incentives are to weaken or strengthen, in either case the binary approach is an
invitation to inauthenticity and manipulation of religious identity.

Even if the institutions are acting in complete good faith, the binary approach requires
bureaucrats and judges to make fine-grained determinations about the extent to which an
organization has a religious identity. In some contexts, that inquiry is not problematic. For
example, IRS officials sometimes do this for the limited purpose of ensuring that an organization

28

Zoe Robinson, What is a “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 181 (2014).
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claiming to be religious is not a fraud.29 However, in the broader context of all legal treatment
of non-profit institutions, the binary test requires officials to undertake a much more expansive
and less focused examination. Judge McConnell’s well-known opinion in the Colorado
Christian University case30 powerfully explains the constitutional and practical defects of a
searching inquiry into the degree of religiosity manifested by the school in its curriculum, hiring
and admissions policies, and other expectations for students and faculty.

From our perspective, the most important argument against the binary approach is the
absence of a reliable link between the religious character of an institution and the specific claim
of legal privilege at issue. Some claims of legal privilege, such as the ministerial exception, have
a very strong connection with concerns about the state’s limited competence in matters of
doctrine and worship. Other claims of legal privilege, however, have no connection with the
state’s limited competence in such matters. For example, an exemption of religiously based day
care centers from state licensing requirements has virtually no connection with those concerns.
The licensing of day care facilities, which typically involves health and safety regulations,
background checks on caregivers, and occasional inspections, reflects a core exercise of the
state’s legitimate role in protecting children from risk. The religious identity of any particular
day care center should have no bearing on the state’s regulatory authority over the center,
because the state’s concern focuses solely on the well-being of children.

As with houses of worship, the government interacts with religious non-profits in two key
areas – employment relationships and government funding. Unlike houses of worship, however,
29
30

Church of the Chosen People v. U.S., 548 F. Supp. 1247 (D. Minn. 1982).
Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008).
19

government interactions with the broader set of religious non-profits pose much more
complicated questions in both areas.

Employment Relationships

Government regulation of employment relationships within religious non-profits raises a
variety of constitutional and statutory issues. It seems best to begin with the ministerial
exception, which rests on constitutional grounds. As we explained above, the ministerial
exception significantly limits government inquiry into religious employers’ decisions about
certain employees. In houses of worship, the exception applies to employees whose job involves
the transmission of faith. For the broader category of religious non-profits, the analysis is
exactly the same. A chaplain in a religious hospital would certainly be covered, as would a
professor of theology at a seminary.

Beyond the positions that replicate core aspects of the minister’s role in a house of
worship, religious non-profits may claim the protection of the ministerial exception for other
jobs. Courts must evaluate each position, rather than categories of employees, with respect to its
relationship to the purposes of the exemption. In close cases, courts should give greater
deference to institutions that are directly involved in the articulation of religious ideas or delivery
of religious experience, such as schools, counseling services, publishers dedicated to production
of religious works, or summer camps. Correspondingly, courts should give less deference to
institutions that are predominantly oriented to the delivery of discrete services with obvious
secular counterparts, such as healthcare, adoption and other family services, housing, or job
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training. In such service organizations, courts should require strong proof that the role in
question involves the explicit transmission of faith, not just a requirement to serve as a role
model for the faithful.

Like houses of worship, other religious non-profits also may claim the benefit of Section
702 of Title VII – they may prefer co-religionists with respect to all employment positions.
Although the Section 702 exemption may seem uncontroversial with respect to houses of
worship, its justification is less apparent when applied to all activities and positions within
religious non-profits. Why should a religiously affiliated hospital be free to insist that its
accountants or janitors, for example, share the faith commitments of the employer? Indeed, the
original version of the Section 702 exemption was limited to employees engaged in religious
activities. Congress amended Section 702 in 1972, in response to concerns about line-drawing
among various jobs and the extent to which they involved religious activities.

Is the amended Section 702, which applies to all activities of religious non-profits,
disproportionate to any reasonable need for exemption from anti-discrimination norms?
Although the Section 702 exemption certainly imposes costs on individuals excluded from
employment because they do not share the employer’s faith, the exemption nonetheless protects
legitimate and distinctive concerns of faith institutions. Most importantly, the exemption permits
religious non-profits to employ only individuals who share their mission. Seen in that light, the
exemption is designed to avoid discrimination against religious organizations rather than respond
to a religiously distinctive need for separate legal treatment. The exemption places religious
non-profits on equal footing with other cause-oriented organizations. The Democratic Party may
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insist that all its employees be enrolled as voting Democrats; likewise, environmental groups
may require all employees to embrace green commitments.
Although the protection afforded by Section 702 is thus closely linked to legitimate
interests of religious institutions, a different aspect of employment law shows how protections
for religious nonprofits may lack justification under any of the relevant constitutional concerns.
Under current law, adjunct faculty at colleges and universities are eligible to form unions and
engage in collective bargaining with school administrators. Because of the increasing percentage
of non-tenured faculty members in higher education, the right to organize offers an important
protection for a large and growing body of workers. However, federal courts have ruled that the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) lacks the authority to require religious colleges to
permit union organizing among, or to engage in collective bargaining with, adjunct faculty.31
Those who defend the exemption for religious colleges ground it in the autonomy of religious
institutions. Government involvement in the relationship between teachers and administrators,
they contend, would violate the schools’ “right to be free from government meddling and
intrusion in their operations and beliefs.”32
This asserted right can be traced back to the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago,33 which involved an effort to form a union among lay teachers at
parochial schools in Chicago. The Court construed the National Labor Relations Act to exclude
the employment relationship between lay teachers and church-operated schools. In its rationale
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for the decision, the Court emphasized the Establishment Clause limitations on government
funding of religious schools. At that time, schools that fit the Court’s description of “pervasively
sectarian” were categorically ineligible for government funding because such funding necessarily
carried the risk of “excessive entanglement” between government and religion. The limits on
government funding, the Court explained, are necessary to avoid governmental intrusion in
decisions about the extent to which religion is incorporated in the curriculum.
Catholic Bishop appropriately extended that categorical logic to the question of NLRB
jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that government supervision of the collective bargaining
process might be similarly intrusive. What the government may not fund it likewise may not
regulate, outside of basic concerns about force and fraud.
Even at that time, however, few colleges and universities fell into the class of
“pervasively sectarian” entities, and so most religious colleges qualified for a wide range of
government funding programs.34 Concerns about excessive entanglement were much less
significant in that setting, so the risk of unconstitutional intrusion by the NLRB should have been
correspondingly weaker. Now that the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has
refocused on the character of specific activities rather than institutions as a whole, those concerns
are weaker still. Nonetheless, and despite the NLRB’s continued efforts to assert jurisdiction,
federal courts continue to hold that the agency has no authority over the relationship between
religious colleges and their teachers.
Indeed, most recent litigation involves not the fundamental question of religious schools’
exemption, but rather the agency’s definition of religious schools. The agency has attempted to
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deploy a narrow definition, akin to the old category of “pervasively sectarian schools.” Under
that standard, the Catholic Bishop exemption would apply only to schools that demonstrate their
religious character by, for example, preferring co-religionists in admission, requiring faculty and
students to adhere to certain beliefs, and imposing mandatory religious curriculum. Religious
colleges contend that the NLRB’s test impermissibly involves the government in what are
essentially religious determinations, such as the extent to which religious commitments are
present in a school’s curriculum.
We have a great deal of sympathy with that particular concern about the NLRB’s
definitional approach, but not with the religious colleges’ broad claim of exemption. The
NLRB’s test rests on a fundamental error. Whatever justification the Court had for exempting
parochial schools in Catholic Bishop, no such rationale can support the current categorical
exemption of religious colleges from NLRB jurisdiction. Any concerns about NLRB intrusion in
religious education can be handled by regulatory measures far more precise than the categorical
exemption of religious higher education. For example, the college could be required to bargain
only over a set of indisputably secular conditions of employment, such as wages and hours,
benefits, or office space. That more refined treatment of religious colleges, unlike the current
institutional exclusion, satisfies the concern for treatment that is closely tailored to distinctive
limits on the state’s power in dealing with religious matters.
Government Funding
Over the last two decades, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on government funding of
faith-based institutions has taken a dramatic turn. During the 1970s, the Court adopted a
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categorical prohibition on government aid for “pervasively sectarian” organizations.35 Under
that formulation, the Establishment Clause barred government support for entities that engage in
worship and explicitly religious instruction. As a practical matter, the litigation involved
religious primary and secondary schools, usually Catholic. Virtually everyone at the time
assumed that the ban encompassed all houses of worship, and as a matter of logic, it also
included religious non-profits primarily engaged in faith-intensive forms of social service.

By the early years of the 21st century, however, the Court’s interpretation of the
Establishment Clause considerably narrowed the prohibition on state funding of religion. In
place of a prohibition on aid for “pervasively sectarian” institutions, the Court found two paths to
a much wider range of funding for religious non-profits. First, in accord with the general themes
of this chapter, the Court shifted from an institutional focus to a more precise prohibition on
government funding of “specifically religious” activities.36 The category of “pervasively
sectarian” entities is now irrelevant as a matter of constitutional law, but the distinction between
secular and specifically religious activity remains central. Second, the Court distinguished direct
aid from indirect aid, such as voucher-based financing of private schools.37 The ban on funding
of “specifically religious activities” applies to any program in which the government provides
direct support, such as subsidy for the salaries of personnel or payment of overhead expenses.
When government aid depends solely on the uncoerced choice of program beneficiaries,
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however, the institution to which the beneficiary directs the aid is free to provide services
intertwined with specifically religious content.

These two tracks of funding enable and regulate the federal government’s initiatives for
engaging faith-based institutions in the provision of social welfare services. Originally framed as
the Faith Based and Community Initiative of President George W. Bush, and continued as
President Obama’s program for Faith Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, these efforts guide
the use of government resources in social welfare programs by reference to the constitutional
norms appropriate to direct and indirect government support. With respect to direct support,
federal regulations and guidance materials define the relevant limit on what types of activities
may be supported by government grants.38 Private institutions that receive these grants must use
them only to support services with secular content; social services that include religious content,
if offered, must be privately financed and separated by time or place from publicly financed
services.

When the government’s support is indirect, however, these requirements of separation do
not apply. The set of eligible providers may include those who use specifically religious
language or concepts to deliver the service. Nevertheless, those who design programs of indirect
aid must ensure that all beneficiaries have adequate secular options for receiving the service.
The constitutional logic of indirect aid depends on the free choice of beneficiaries between
secular and religious options for receiving the service. If the beneficiary has secular choices that
38
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are qualitatively adequate and reasonably accessible, and the beneficiary nonetheless chooses a
program with religious content, then the government should not be held responsible for the
beneficiary’s religious experience.

This shift to the two-path structure of Establishment Clause law represents a significant
opening for religious institutions to participate in programs of government-funded social welfare
services. Some who assert the “freedom of the church,” however, believe that the current
structure remains unduly restrictive. By forbidding direct aid to faith-integrated programs, they
claim, the government discriminates against religious providers who are not willing or able to
segregate secular and religious elements of their programs, as well as those whose services do
not fall within programs of indirect financing.

What these critics see as discrimination, we view as appropriate and focused concern for
important constitutional values. Our counterarguments are grounded in the fundamental
character of civil government, as well as respect for the dignity of program beneficiaries. As we
explain in our book, 39 a core characteristic of the American experiment has been its commitment
to the secular character of civil authority. Among the most important aspects of that character is
the idea that civil government should not use religion as a means to the state’s own ends,
however laudable those goals might be.40
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The concern for the dignity of program beneficiaries, by contrast, is recognized – or at
least conceded – by even the most religion-friendly architects of the relationship between
government and faith-based service providers. Put most simply, programs that receive direct
government aid may not condition the delivery of government-financed services on the
willingness of beneficiaries to engage in religious activities. Any specifically religious activities
offered by such programs must be distinct from the government-funded services, and completely
voluntary for beneficiaries. To require less than that would be to deny the fundamental dignity
of aid beneficiaries, by exposing them to religious coercion as the price of receiving public
assistance.

Advocates of a strong “freedom of the church” have been especially concerned about the
possibility that receipt of government support will bring limitations on providers’ right to prefer
co-religionists in delivering those services. Prior to the Faith-Based Initiative, most federal
agencies required all grant recipients to refrain from engaging in various forms of employment
discrimination, including based on religion. The agencies provided no exception to religious
grantees. Thus, any religious entity that received public funding was required to agree not to
prefer co-religionists in employment. The rules that emerged under the Faith Based Initiative
directly and immediately address this concern. Unless funding statutes require otherwise, the
rules assure faith-based grant recipients that their freedom to prefer co-religionists would be
preserved.

For-Profit Corporations
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As we explained at the beginning of the chapter, corporate entities, including businesses,
have the legal right to adopt and manifest a religious identity. The decision to claim a religious
identity belongs to those who have legal control over the entity. Others have unpacked the
complex issues of corporate law embedded in that decision, including questions concerning how
disagreements among owners, or related issues of control, affect the entity’s claim of a religious
identity. But, from our perspective, that claim is a private matter to be resolved among the
corporation’s constituents by ordinary legal norms.

Our focus is limited to the implications that should follow from that assertion. In terms
of expressive freedom, the law gives business owners significant latitude to use corporate assets
to advance religious messages, even if those messages have no direct relationship to the goods or
services provided. For example, businesses can display religious texts or give customers
religious materials. Moreover, businesses are free to emphasize the role that religious values
play in their corporate practices. Hobby Lobby closed on Sundays; many businesses owned by
observant Jews have long closed on Saturdays and other holy days. Businesses may emphasize
certain music, videos, or publications that have religious themes, and refuse to carry others that
they deem inappropriate for religious reasons.

From the law’s perspective, a corporation’s assertion of a religious identity will only
matter when the manifestations of that identity collide with the entity’s legal duties to
employees, customers, and others. The most frequent locus for these collisions is the
employment relationship, and we turn to that first, before considering relationships with
customers.
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Employees

In what ways might the religious identity of a for-profit corporation make a difference for
its employees? Some businesses have argued that, in order to fully embrace their religious
identity, employment must be restricted to those who share the faith commitments of the
business owners.41 Other businesses have required employees to participate in religious
observances during the work day, and have disciplined employees who fail to do so. These
employers’ practices would seem obviously to violate Title VII, which prohibits employment
discrimination based on religion. But, in these instances, the employers have argued that they
fall within Title VII’s exemption for religious entities. The exemption reads:

This subchapter shall not apply to . . . a religious corporation, association, educational
institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association,
educational institution, or society of its activities.

The governing law interpreting this exemption limits it to entities that are “primarily religious” in
their character and activities. This limitation applies to both non-profit and for-profit entities.
Indeed, the EEOC has ruled ineligible a number of prominent non-profits that have religious
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origins, affiliations, and titles, because the organizations’ activities no longer reflected significant
religious content.42

Although for-profit entities are theoretically capable of meeting the “primarily religious”
standard, no judicial decision has ever extended the exemption to a for-profit business. The
leading case, EEOC v. Townley Engineering Company,43 interpreted “primarily religious” in
terms of the content of the business. Because the company manufactured mining equipment, the
court ruled that the productive activity of the business had no relationship with religion, even if
the owners engaged in various forms of religious expression in the workplace.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby may call into question the EEOC’s
effective exclusion of businesses from the class of “religious corporations” under § 702. A firm
like Hobby Lobby that wanted to hire only co-religionists could argue either that it falls under
the definition of “religious corporation” in § 702, or that the Title VII bar on religion-based
discrimination imposes a substantial burden on their religious exercise.44 If either argument
succeeded, the class of entities – including businesses – legally permitted to prefer co-religionists
in employment would expand considerably.
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We think this would be a profound mistake. Recall that the original version of § 702
exempted religious organizations from Title VII’s ban on religious discrimination only with
respect to employees that are directly engaged in religious activities. Congress broadened the
exemption to avoid line-drawing problems, but in doing so has already removed a significant
number of non-religious jobs from the protections of Title VII.

Broadening the number of exempted employers – and jobs – has two problematic
consequences. First, it further limits employment opportunities on the basis of religion, and thus
conflicts with one of the central purposes of Title VII, which is designed to reduce status-based
barriers to employment. Second, permitting even more employers to select employees based on
religion would increase religion-based segregation within society, as what used to be religiously
diverse workplaces became religiously insular. We firmly believe that religious equality in the
labor market has promoted civic harmony, and helped to mitigate the divisiveness and conflict
that have plagued other parts of the world.

The traditional limitation of the § 702 exemption to entities that are “primarily religious”
in their character and activities seems to us a much better way of reconciling the competing
concerns. In applying that standard, the EEOC and courts should be open to the possibility of
for-profit employers qualifying as “primarily religious.” The best candidates for that status
would be businesses whose productive activities involve goods or services that have thickly
religious content. For example, a store exclusively devoted to selling books and other goods
linked to a particular faith tradition should qualify as “primarily religious.”
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Even if an entity does so qualify, it still may enjoy some legal protection for employment
decisions that affect the religious character of the organization. If a for-profit corporation hires
an employee specifically to advance its religious mission, that employee may well fall within the
scope of the ministerial exception. To the best of our knowledge, all reported decisions that
involve the ministerial exception have arisen in the context of a house of worship or a religious
non-profit entity. But we see no reason in principle that a for-profit entity would be barred from
raising the ministerial exception.

For example, imagine that Hobby Lobby hires a corporate chaplain who is an ordained
minister in the owners’ faith tradition. The chaplain is hired to provide counseling for
employees, as well as regular worship and other religious services for the owners and any
employees who want to participate.45 What if the owners dismiss the chaplain for promoting
theological beliefs inconsistent with the beliefs of the owners, and the chaplain files a claim
under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion?

Or imagine that religious authorities required kosher or halal butcher shops to employ a
full-time religious inspector, who would constantly monitor the practices of other employees in
the shop and resolve any disputed questions of religious law.46 If such an inspector filed a
discrimination claim against his butcher shop employer, could the shop invoke the ministerial
exception?
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The best argument against allowing the owners to assert the ministerial exception is that
expanding the doctrine to encompass for-profit entities presents a problem of the slippery slope.
Could the employer then designate a significant portion of the workforce as “missionaries,” who
spend most of their day performing ordinary tasks, but also have some responsibility for
“ministerial duties” such as leading prayer or sharing religious messages with customers? Recall
that Cheryl Perich, the plaintiff in Hosanna-Tabor, spent the bulk of her work hours in secular
teaching and related duties. The predominance of secular tasks did not remove Perich from the
class of “ministerial” employees. But that conclusion reflects an implicit judgment about the
employer, a religious school. Given that the school’s mission included inculcation of the faith,
the Supreme Court appropriately deferred to the school’s decision about how to allocate
responsibilities for leading the children in prayer and worship.

For entities that are not engaged in “primarily religious” activities, however, we would
expect the ministerial exception to take on a far more limited character. Where the Court in
Hosanna Tabor substantially deferred to the religious entity’s allocation of responsibilities, a
business entity should only be able to claim the exception with respect to positions that have
exclusively and explicitly religious duties. Moreover, the employer should clearly communicate
to the employee both the religious character of the duties and the legal consequences that follow
from that ministerial character.

Customers
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A religious business is also likely to manifest its religious identity in relationships with
customers. We have written about the complicated issues that arise when business entities
decide, on religious grounds, not to serve particular classes of customers.47 The most prominent
recent examples include some businesses’ refusal to serve same-sex couples, or to provide goods
for use at same-sex weddings. We think that the public character of these businesses, the sweep
of goods and services that such refusals might cover, and the risks of both material and stigmatic
harm to same sex couples counsel strongly against exemptions of such businesses from relevant
anti-discrimination laws.

A very different set of issues arises when the government attempts, or is asked by
consumers, to regulate the religious quality of goods sold by a business. When a business
advertises that its meat is “100% kosher,” should a court or government agency be able to decide
whether that claim is truthful? This question does not implicate the religious freedom of
merchants. Instead, this issue focuses on the government’s competence to articulate and apply
religious standards.

In a variety of contexts, courts have quite appropriately held that the government has no
authority to declare what the standards of religious dietary law are, or whether a particular
merchant has complied with those standards. Attempts by several states to create government
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agencies that would enforce kosher fraud laws have been held unconstitutional under the
Establishment Clause.48

By contrast, the state should be able to adjudicate whether specific factual assertions by
merchants are truthful. Such assertions include what animal, or part of an animal, particular
meat comes from, as well as whether the meat has been inspected and approved by a specific
religious authority. These are questions of objectively verifiable fact; neither involves the content
of religious norms, or appraisals of fidelity to them. Questions of that type are off-limits to the
government, even if they arise in a context where commercial fraud is a possibility. States must
find secular avenues for policing such fraud, and leave religious policing to private parties,
including customers and religious authorities.

Conclusion

As readers of this volume know, a number of other scholars in the field are drawn to
sweeping generalizations about “church autonomy” and “freedom of the church.” In past
writing, they have been willing to leave to another day the hard questions raised by their
approach – in particular, who qualifies as “the church,” and in what specific contexts should the
state treat “the church” as autonomous. We think this failure to attend to particular and difficult
questions is the path to over-broad regimes of religious exemption and unjustified norms of
religious privilege.
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Religious exemptions are not a function of private freedoms, of “the church” or
otherwise. Instead, they arise primarily from an understanding of what government may not
appraise, decide, or support. Corporate identity is connected to this understanding only because
of the likelihood of, and frequency with which, such questions will arise. Whether as house of
worship, religious non-profit, or religiously identified for-profit, the corporate character of
religious identity serves only as a rough marker for the need to be sensitive to the appearance of
such questions, and can serve as a guide to reasoning about them at the margin. At the most
fundamental level, what is off-limits to the state is a constant, and does not change by virtue of
private choices to express religious identity in a variety of forms, institutional, associational, or
otherwise.
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